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Abstract. We present a Bounded Model Checking technique for higher-
order programs. The vehicle of our study is a higher-order calculus with
general references. Our technique is a symbolic state syntactical transla-
tion based on SMT solvers, adapted to a setting where the values passed
and stored during computation can be functions of arbitrary order. We
prove that our algorithm is sound, and devise an optimisation based on
points-to analysis to improve scalability. We moreover provide a proto-
type implementation of the algorithm with experimental results show-
casing its performance.
1 Introduction
Bounded Model Checking [3] (BMC) is a model checking technique that allows
for highly automated and scalable SAT/SMT-based verification and has been
widely used to find errors in C-like languages [4,10,5,1]. BMC amounts to bound-
ing the executions of programs by unfolding loops only up to a given bound, and
model checking the resulting execution graph. Since the advent of Cbmc [4],
the mainstream approach additionally proceeds by symbolically executing pro-
gram paths and gathering the resulting path conditions in propositional formulas
which can then be passed on to SAT/SMT solvers. Thus, BMC performs a syn-
tactic translation of program source code into a propositional formula, and uses
the power of SAT/SMT solvers to check the bounded behaviour of programs.
Being a Model Checking technique, BMC has the ability to produce coun-
terexamples, which are execution traces that lead to the violation of desired
properties. A specific advantage of BMC over unbounded techniques is that it
avoids the full effect of state-space explosion at the expense of full verification.
On the other hand, since BMC is inconclusive if the formula is unsatisfiable, it
is generally regarded as a bug-finding or underapproximation technique, which
lets it avoid spurious errors. While it tends to be the most empirically effective
approach for “shallow” bugs [5,1], bugs in deep loops and recursion are often a
weakness. It is only possible to prove complete correctness if bounds for loops
and recursion are determinable.
The above approach has been predominantly applied to imperative, first-
order languages and, while tools like Cbmc can handle C++ (and, more recently,
Java bytecode), the foundations of BMC for higher-order programs have not
been properly laid. This is what we address herein. We propose a symbolic BMC
procedure for higher-order functional/imperative programs that may contain
free variables of ground type. Our contributions involve a syntactical translation
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to apply BMC to higher-order languages with higher-order state, a proof that
the approach is sound, an optimisation based on points-to analysis to improve
scalability, and a prototype implementation of the procedure with experimental
results showcasing its performance.
As with most approaches to software BMC, we translate a given higher-order
program into a propositional formula for an SMT solver to check for satisfiability,
where formulas are satisfiable only if a violation is reachable within a given
bound. Where in first-order programs BMC places a bound on loop unfolding,
in the higher-order setting we place the bound on nested recursive calls. The main
challenge for the translation then is the symbolic execution of paths which involve
the flow of higher-order terms, by either variable binding or use of the store. This
is achieved by adapting the standard technique of Static Single Assignment to
a setting where variables/references can be of higher order. To handle higher-
order terms in particular, we use a nominal approach to methods, whereby each
method is uniquely identified by a name. We capture program behaviour by also
uniquely identifying every step in the computation tree with a return variable;
analogous to how Cbmc [4] captures the behaviour of sequencing commands in
ANSI-C programs.
To give a simple example of the approach, consider the following code, where
r is a reference of type int→ int, and f, g, h are variables of type int→ int, and
n, x are variables of type int.
1 let f = λ x,g,h. if (x <= 0) then g else h
2 in
3 r := f n (λ x. x−1) (λ x. x+1);
4 assert(!r n >= n)
In the code above, a function is assigned to reference r. In a symbolic setting, it
is not immediately obvious which function to call when dereferencing r in line 4.
Luckily, we know that when calling f in line 3, its value can only be the one
bound to it in line 1. Thus, a first transformation of the code could be:
3 r := if (n <= 0) then (λ x. x−1) else (λ x. x+1);
4 assert(!r n >= n)
The assignment in line 3 can be facilitated by using a return variable ret and
method names for (λx.x− 1) and (λx.x+ 1):
1 let m1 = λ x. x−1 in let m2 = λ x. x+1 in
2 let ret = if (n <= 0) then m1 else m2 in
3 r := ret;
4 assert(!r n >= n)
We now need to symbolically decide how to dereference r. The simplest solution
is try to match r with all existing functions of matching type, in this case m1
and m2:
1 let m1 = λ x. x−1 in let m2 = λ x. x+1 in
2 let ret = if (n <= 0) then m1 else m2 in
3 r := ret;
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4 let ret ’ = match r with
5 | m1 −> m1 n
6 | m2 −> m2 n in
7 assert(ret’ >= n)
Performing the substitutions of m1,m2, we can read off the following formula
for checking falsity of the assertion:
(ret′ < n) ∧ (r = m1⇒ ret′ = n− 1)
∧ (r = m2⇒ ret′ = n+ 1) ∧ (r = ret)
∧ (n <= 0⇒ ret = m1) ∧ (n > 0⇒ ret = m2)
The above is true e.g. for n = 0, and hence the code violates the assertion.
These ideas underpin our first BMC translation, which is presented in Sec-
tion 3. The language we examine, HORef, is a higher-order language with gen-
eral references and integer arithmetic. While correct, one can quickly see that
our first translation is inefficient when trying to resolve the flow of functions to
references and variables. In effect, it explores all possible methods of the appro-
priate type that have been created so far, and relies on the solver to pick the
right one. In Section 5, we optimise the translation by restricting such choices
according to an analysis akin to points-to analysis [15,2]. Finally, in Section 6
we present an implementation of our technique in a BMC tool for a higher-order
OCaml-like syntax extending HORef and test it on several example programs
adapted from the MoCHi benchmark [13].
2 The Language: HORef
Here we present a higher-order language with (higher-order) state, which we call
HORef, as an idealised setting for languages like Java and OCaml. The syntax
consists of a call-by-value λ-calculus with types
θ ::= unit | int | θ × θ | θ → θ
and references of arbitrary types. We assume countable disjoint sets Vars, Refs
and Meths, for variables, references and methods respectively. Variables are
ranged over by x and variants; references by r and variants; and methods by
m and variants. We assume these sets are typed, that is:
Vars =
⊎
θ
Varsθ, Refs =
⊎
θ
Refsθ,
Meths =
⊎
θ,θ′
Methsθ→θ′ .
The syntax and typing rules are given in Figure 1. Note that we assume a
set of arithmetic operators ⊕, which we leave unspecified as they do not affect
the analysis. We extend the syntax with usual constructs for sequencing and
assertions: M ;N stands for let _ = M in N ; while r++ is r := !r + 1; and
assert(M) is if M then () else fail (with boolean values represented by 0, 1).
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Terms Terms 3 M ::= fail | x | m | i | () | r := M | !r |M ⊕M | 〈M,M〉
| pi1M | pi2M | x M | m M | if M then M else M
| let x = M in M | letrec x = λx.M in M | λx.M
Values Vals 3 v ::= x | m | i | () | 〈v, v〉
fail : θ () : unit i : int
x ∈ Varsθ
x : θ
m ∈ Methsθ,θ′
m : θ → θ′
M1,M2 : int
M1 ⊕M2 : int
M : int M0 : θ M1 : θ
if M then M1 else M0 : θ
M1 : θ1 M2 : θ2
〈M1,M2〉 : θ1 × θ2
〈M1,M2〉 : θ1 × θ2
pii〈M1,M2〉 : θi (i = 1, 2)
r ∈ Refsθ
!r : θ
r ∈ Refsθ M : θ
r := M : unit
M : θ′ x : θ
λx.M : θ → θ′
M : θ N : θ′ x : θ
let x = M in N : θ′
M : θ′ N : θ′′ x : θ → θ′ y : θ
letrec x = λy.M in N : θ′′
x : θ → θ′ M : θ
x M : θ′
m ∈ Methsθ→θ′ M : θ
m M : θ′
Fig. 1. Grammar and typing rules for HORef
Note that the use of typed variables allows us to type terms without need for
typing contexts. As usual, a variable occurrence is free if it is not in the scope
of a matching (λ/let/letrec)-binder. Terms are considered modulo α-equivalence
and in particular we may assume that no variable occurs both as free and bound
in the same term. We call a term closed if it contains no free variables.
References in our language are global, and there is no fresh reference creation
construct (this choice made for simplicity). On the other hand, methods are
dynamically created in terms, and for that reason we will be frequently referring
to them as names. The terminology comes from nominal techniques [6,12]. On
a related note, λ-abstractions are not values in our language. This is due to the
fact that in the semantics these get evaluated to method names.
In our approach, checking for violations of safety properties is reduced to the
reachability of failure. We have therefore included the fail primitive for when
a program reaches a failure. Accordingly, our bounded model checking routine
will return fail when it aborts on reaching a failure and nil when it aborts on
reaching the bound. The use of nil is analogous to the unwinding assertions used
in Cbmc. It is not part of the syntax of HORef.
Bounded Operational Semantics We next present a bounded operational seman-
tics for HORef, which is the one captured by our bounded BMC routine. The
semantics is parameterised by a bound k which, similarly to loop unwinding in
procedural languages, it bounds the depth of method (i.e. function) calls within
an execution. A bound k = 0 in particular means that, unless no method calls
are made, execution will terminate returning nil. Consequently, in this bounded
operational semantics, all programs must halt; either when the program itself
halts (returning a value or fail), or when the bound is exceeded. Note at this
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point that the standard (unbounded) semantics of HORef, allowing arbitrary
recursion, can be obtained e.g. by allowing bound values k =∞.
To describe this behaviour, we chose a big-step operational semantics repre-
sentation with rules of the form
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
where χ ∈ (Vals∪{fail,nil}). In other words, all terms must eventually evaluate
to a value, fail or nil. A configuration is a quadruple (M,R, S, k) where M is
a typed term and:
– R : Meths⇀ Terms is a finite map, called a method repository , such that
for all m ∈ dom(R), if m ∈Methsθ→θ′ then R(m) = λx.M : θ → θ′.
– S : Refs⇀ Vals is a finite map, called a store , such that for all r ∈ dom(S),
if r ∈ Refsθ then S(r) : θ.
– k ∈ {nil}∪N is the nested calling bound, where decrementing k beyond zero
results in nil.
A closed configuration is one all of whose components are closed. We call a con-
figuration (M,R, S, k) valid if all methods and references appearing in M,R, S
are included in dom(R) and dom(S) respectively. A closed configuration is one
all of whose components are closed.
Definition 1. The operational semantics is defined on closed valid configura-
tions, by the rules given in Figure 2.
Nominal determinacy While the operational semantics is bounded in depth, the
reduction tree of a given term can still be infinite because of the non-determinacy
involved in evaluating λ-abstractions (rule ⇓λ): the rule non-deterministically
creates a fresh name m and extends the repository with m mapped to the given
λ-abstraction. This kind of non-determinism, which can be seen as determinism
up to fresh name creation, is formalised below.
Let us consider permutations pi : Meths → Meths such that, for all m, if
m ∈Methsθ→θ′ then pi(m) ∈Methsθ→θ′ . We call such a permutation pi finite if
the set {a | pi(a) 6= a} is finite. Given a syntactic objectX (e.g. a term, repository,
or store) and a finite permutation pi, we write pi · X for the object we obtain
from X if we swap each name a appearing in it with pi(a). Put otherwise, the
operation · is an action from finite permutations of Meths to the set of objects
X. Given a set ∆ ⊆ Meths and objects X,X ′, we write X ∼∆ X ′ whenever
there exists a finite permutation pi such that:
pi ·X = X ′ ∧ ∀a ∈ ∆. pi(a) = a
and say that X and X ′ or nominally equivalent up to ∆.
Lemma 1. Given (M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′), for all (χ′, R′′, S′′) we have
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ′, R′′, S′′) iff (χ, R′, S′) ∼dom(∆) (χ′, R′′, S′′).
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(⇓nil) (M,R, S,nil) ⇓ (nil, R, S) (⇓fail) (fail, R, S, k) ⇓ (fail, R, S)
(⇓val) (v,R, S, k) ⇓ (v,R, S) (⇓drf) (!r,R, S, k) ⇓ (S(r), R, S)
(⇓λ) (λx.M,R, S) ⇓ (m,R[m 7→ λx.M ], S) where m /∈ dom(R)
(⇓pii)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (〈v1, v2〉, R′, S′)
(piiM,R, S, k) ⇓ (vi, R′, S′)
i = 1, 2 (⇓:=)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (v,R′, S′)
(r := M,R, S, k) ⇓ ((), R′, S′[r 7→ v])
(⇓⊕)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (i1, R1, S1) (M2, R1, S1, k) ⇓ (i2, R2, S2)
(M1 ⊕M2, R, S, k) ⇓ (i, R2, S2) (where i = i1 ⊕ i2)
(⇓×)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (v1, R1, S1) (M2, R1, S1, k) ⇓ (v2, R2, S2)
(〈M1,M2〉, R, S, k) ⇓ (〈v1, v2〉, R2, S2)
(⇓let)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (v,R′, S′) (N{v/x}, R′, S′, k) ⇓ (v′, R′′, S′′)
(let x = M in N,R, S, k) ⇓ (v′, R′′, S′′)
(⇓@)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (v,R′, S′) (N{v/x}, R′, S′, k−1) ⇓ (v′, R′′, S′′)
(mM,R, S, k) ⇓ (v′, R′′, S′′) (where R(m) = λx.N)
(⇓if)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (i, R′, S′) (Mj , R′, S′, k) ⇓ (vj , Rj , Sj)
(if M then M1 else M0, R, S, k) ⇓ (vj , Rj , Sj)
(⇓rec)
(N [m/f ], R[m 7→ λx.M{m/f}], S, k) ⇓ (v,R′, S′)
(letrec f = λx.M in N,R, S, k) ⇓ (v′, R′, S′)
( 6⇓pii)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(piiM,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
i = 1, 2 (6⇓:=)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(r := M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
( 6⇓⊕1)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R1, S1)
(M1 ⊕M2, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R1, S1)
( 6⇓⊕2)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (i1, R1, S1) (M2, R1, S1, k) ⇓ (χ, R2, S2)
(M1 ⊕M2, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R2, S2)
( 6⇓×1)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R1, S1)
(〈M1,M2〉, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R1, S1)
( 6⇓×2)
(M1, R, S, k) ⇓ (v1, R1, S1) (M2, R1, S1, k) ⇓ (χ, R2, S2)
(〈M1,M2〉, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R2, S2)
( 6⇓let1)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(let x = M in M ′, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
( 6⇓let2)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (v′, R′, S′) (N{v/x}, R′, S′, k) ⇓ (χ, R′′, S′′)
(let x = M in M ′, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′′, S′′)
( 6⇓@1)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(mM,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
( 6⇓@2)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (v,R′, S′) (N{v/x}, R′, S′, k−1) ⇓ (χ, R′′, S′′)
(mM,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′′, S′′) (where R(m) = λx.N)
(6⇓if1)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(if M then M1 else M0, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(6⇓if2)
(M,R, S, k) ⇓ (i, R′, S′) (Mj , R′, S′, k) ⇓ (χ, Rj , Sj)
(if M then M1 else M0, R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, Rj , Sj)
( 6⇓rec)
(N [m/f ], R[m 7→ λx.M{m/f}, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
(letrec f = λx.M in N,R, S, k) ⇓ (χ, R′, S′)
Fig. 2. Bounded operational semantics rules. In all cases, k 6= nil, χ ∈ {fail,nil}, and
j = 0 if i = 0, and j = 1 otherwise.
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To illustrate bounding of method application and the use of names in place
of methods, we provide the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following recursive higher-order program of HORef
(with some syntactic sugar) which we shall unwind with a bound k = 2.
r := 0;
letrec f = λ x. if x then (r++; f (x − 1))
else (λ y. assert (y = !r + x))
in
let g = f 5 in g 5
Let us write the above program as r := 0;M1, andM1 as letrec f = λx.M2 in M3.
We can attempt to evaluate (r := 0;M1,∅,∅, 2) as follows. Below we let Si =
{r 7→ i}, and Ni = λy. assert(y = !r + i).
1. First, (r := 0,∅,∅, 2) ⇓ ((),∅, S0, 2),
2. next, evaluate (letrec f = λx.M2 in M3,∅, S0, 2),
3. i.e. (M3{m1/f}, R, S0, 2), with R = {m1 7→ λx.M2{m1/f}},
4. i.e. (let g = m1 5 in g 5, R, S0, 2),
5. now, first evaluate (m1 5, R, S0, 2),
6. i.e. (if 5 then (r++;m1(5− 1)) else N5, R, S0, 1),
7. i.e. (r++;m1(5− 1), R, S0, 1),
8. i.e. (m14, R, S1, 1),
9. i.e. (if 4 then (r++;m1(4− 1)) else N4, R, S1, 0),
10. i.e. (r++;m1(4− 1), R, S1, 0),
11. i.e. (m13, R, S2, 0),
12. i.e. (if 3 then (r++;m1(3− 1)) else N3, R, S2,nil),
which returns nil.
Hence, the evaluation aborts with nil. The interesting part of the program is the
assertion, which is not reached with this bound. Setting the bound to 6, m1 will
eventually be called with 0 and return the function N0. The latter will be bound
to g and called on 5, and at that point r will have value 5, so the assertion will
pass. Setting initially r := 1 would lead to failure.
Intuitively, the bounded semantics is equivalent to a bounded inlining of
methods. As such, evaluating the example with k = 2 can be seen as unwinding
the program as follows (where we have also included the function definitions for
clarity).
r := 0;
letrec f =
λ x. if x then (r++; f (x − 1))
else (λ y. assert(y = !r + x))
in
let g = if 5 then ( r++;
if 4 then (r++; nil)
else (λ y. assert(y = !r + 4)) )
else (λ y. assert(y = !r + 5))
in if 5 then ( r++;
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if 4 then (r++; nil)
else assert(5 = !r + 4) )
else assert(5 = !r + 5)
We will come back to this example in the next section.
3 A Bounded Translation for HORef
We present an algorithm which, given a term M and a bound k, produces a
propositional formula which captures the bounded semantics of M , for the bound
k. More precisely, the algorithm receives a valid configuration (M,R, S, k) as in-
put, where M may only contain free variables of ground type, and produces
a formula φ and a variable ret. Then, for any substitution σ0 closing the con-
figuration, and any corresponding formula σ◦0 , (M,R, S, k){σ0} reaches some
χ ∈ Vals ∪ {fail,nil} iff
(φ ∧ σ◦0) =⇒ (ret = χ)
is satisfiable. The formal statement and proof of the above is given in Theorem 1.
It is slightly more elaborate as it takes into account the possibly different choices
of fresh method names in the translation and evaluation.
The translation operates on intermediate symbolic configurations, of the form
(M,R,C,D, φ, k), where:
– C,D : Refs ⇀ SSAVars are static single assignment (SSA) maps where
SSAVars is the set of SSA variables of the form ri such that i is the number of
times r has been assigned to so far. The map C is counting all the assignments
that have taken place so far in the translation, whereas D only counts those
in the current path. E.g. C(r) = r5 if r has been assigned to five times so
far. We write C[r] to mean update C with reference r: if C(r) = ri, then
C[r] = C[r 7→ ri+1], where ri+1 is fresh.
– φ is a propositional formula containing the behaviour of the current path so
far.
Moreover, R is a repository storing all methods created so far, and k is the bound.
The translation returns tuples of the form (ret, φ,R,C,D), where φ,R,C,D have
the same interpretation, albeit for after reaching the end of all paths for the term
M . The variable ret represents the return value of the initial configuration.
The algorithm uses a fresh-name generator, which is left unspecified but
deterministically produces the next fresh name, or variable, or SSA variable of
appropriate type. Following the SSA approach, the variables ret in particular are
always chosen fresh, so that each ret identifies a unique evaluation point in the
translation. We use SSA form because it allows us reason about assignment as
equations. We compute the SSA form on the fly by substituting all free variables
with their corresponding ret at binding, and through the use of SSA-maps C
and D for references.
We now describe the translation. The translation stops when either the bound
nil, a fail, or a value v has been reached. The base cases add clauses mapping
return variables to actual values of evaluating M .
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Inductive cases build the symbolic trace of M by recording in φ all changes
to the store, and the return values (ret) at each step in the computation tree.
These steps are then chained together using the guard F :
F a b φ = ((a = fail)⇒ (b = fail)) ∧ ((a = nil)⇒ (b = nil))
∧ ((a = fail) ∨ (a = nil) ∨ φ)
which propagates nil and fail, and the SSA maps C,D.
The difference between reading (D) and writing (C) is noticeable when
branching. There are two branching cases here: the conditional case, and the
one for application xM . In the former one, we branch according to the return
value of the condition (denoted by retb), and each branch translates M0 and M1
respectively. In this case, both branches read from the same map Db, but may
contain different assignments, which we accumulate in C. The formula ψ0 ∧ ψ1
encodes a binary decision tree with guarded clauses that represent the path
guards.
When applying variables as methods (xM , with x : θ), we encode in ψ an n-
ary decision tree where n is the number of methods to consider. This is necessary
since the algorithm is symbolic and therefore agnostic to what x is pointing at.
In such cases, we assume non-determinism, meaning that x could be any method
in the repository R restricted to type θ (denoted R  θ). We call this case non-
deterministic method application . This case seems to be fundamental for
applying BMC to higher-order terms, and higher-order references. It is made
possible by the introduction of names for methods, as it allows for comparison of
higher-order terms as values. Non-deterministic method application is a primary
source of scalability problems, however, and will be discussed in more detail
later.
The BMC translation is given as follows. It transforms each symbolic con-
figuration (M,R,C,D, k) to JM,R,C,D, kK. In all of the cases below, ret is a
fresh variable and k 6= nil. We also assume a common domain Π = dom(C) =
dom(D), which is the finite subset of Refs containing all references that appear
in M and R.
Base Cases:
– JM,R,C,D, φ,nilK = (ret, (ret = nil) ∧ φ,R,C,D)
– Jfail, R, C,D, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = fail) ∧ φ,R,C,D)
– Jv,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = v) ∧ φ,R,C,D)
where v = i, (), x,m
– J!r,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = D(r)) ∧ φ,R,C,D)
– Jλx.M,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = m) ∧ φ,R′, C,D)
where R′ = R[m 7→ λx.M ] and m fresh
Inductive Cases:
– JpiiM,R,C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM,R,C,D, φ, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (ret = pii ret1)) ∧ φ1, R1, C1, D1)
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– JM1 ⊕M2, R, C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM1, R, C,D, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2) = JM2, R1, C1, D1, φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret1 ⊕ ret2)))
∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2)
– J〈M1,M2〉, R, C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM1, R, C,D, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2) = JM2, R1, C1, D1, φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = 〈ret1, ret2〉)))
∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2)
– Jlet x = M in M ′, R, C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM,R,C,D, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2) =JM ′{ret1/x}, R1, C1, D1, φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret2)))
∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2)
– Jletrec f = λx.M in M ′, R, C,D, φ, kK =
let m, f ′ be fresh in
let R′ = R[m 7→ λx.M{f ′/f}] inJM ′{f ′/f}, R′, C,D, φ ∧ (f ′ = m), kK
– JmM,R,C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM,R,C,D, φ, kK in
let R(m) be λx.N in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2) =JN{ret1/x}, R1, C1, D1, φ1, k − 1K in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret2)))
∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2)
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– Jif Mb then M1 else M0, R, C,D, φ, kK =
let (retb, φb, Rb, Cb, Db) = JMb, R, C,D, φ, kK in
let (ret0, φ0, R0, C0, D0) = JM0, Rb, Cb, Db, φb, kK in
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM1, R0, C0, Db, φ0, kK in
let C ′ = C1[r1] · · · [rn] (Π = {r1, . . . , rn}) in
let ψ0 = (retb = 0) =⇒ (F ret0 ret ((ret = ret0)
∧
∧
r∈Π
(C ′(r) = D1(r)))) in
let ψ1 = (retb 6= 0) =⇒ (F ret1 ret ((ret = ret1)
∧
∧
r∈Π
(C ′(r) = D1(r)))) in
(ret, (F retb ret (ψ0 ∧ ψ1)) ∧ φ1, R1, C ′, C ′)
– JxθM,R,C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret0, φ0, R0, C0, D0) = JM,R,C,D, φ, kK in
if R  θ = ∅ then (ret, (ret = nil) ∧ φ0, R0, C0, D0)
else let R  θ be {m1, ...,mn} in
for each i ∈ {1, ..., n} :
let R(mi) be λyi.N in
let (reti, φi, Ri, Ci, Di) =JNi{ret0/yi}, Ri−1, Ci−1, D0, φi−1, k − 1K in
let C ′n = Cn[r1] · · · [rj ] (Π = {r1, . . . , rj}) in
let ψ =
n∧
i=1

(x = mi) =⇒
((F reti ret (ret = reti))∧∧
r∈Π
(C ′n(r) = Di(r)))
 in
(ret, (F ret0 ret ψ) ∧ φn, Rn, C ′n, C ′n)
– Jr := M,R,C,D, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1) = JM,R,C,D, φ, kK in
let C ′1 = C1[r] in let D
′
1 = D1[r 7→ C ′1(r)] in
(ret, (F ret1 ret ((ret = ()) ∧ (D′1(r) = ret1)))
∧ φ1, R1, C ′1, D′1)
To illustrate the algorithm, we look at two characteristic cases. In Jlet x =
M inM ′, R, C,D, φ, kK, we first compute the translation of M . Using the results
of said translation, we can substitute in M ′ the fresh variable ret1 for x, and
compute its translation. To finish, we return ret, chain it to ret2 using predicate
F in φ2, and return the remaining results of translating M
′.
In JxM,R,C,D, φ, kK we see non-deterministic method application in action.
We first translate the argument M and obtain (ret0, φ0, R0, C0, D0). We then
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restrict the repository R to type θ to obtain the set of names identifying all
methods of matching type for x. If no such methods exist, this means that the
binding of x had not succeeded (because of fail/nil) and we are examining a
dead branch, so we immediately return. Otherwise, for each method mi in this
set, we obtain the translation of applying mi to the argument ret0. This is
done by substituting ret0 for yi in the body of mi. After translating all method
applications, all paths are joined in ψ, as described earlier, by constructing an
n-ary decision tree that includes the state of the store in each path. We do this
by incrementing all references in Cn, and adding the clauses C
′
n = Di(r) for each
path. These paths are then guarded by the clauses (x = mi). Finally, we return
a formula that propagates nil and fail in case ret0 reaches either of them. Note
that we return C ′n as both the C and D resulting from translating this term.
This is because all branches have been joined, and any term sequenced after this
one should have all updates available to it.
We now come back to Example 1 to illustrate the intuition of SSA and return
variables, non-deterministic method application, and formula construction.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 modified with free variables n and r0.
r := r0;
letrec f = λ x. if x then (r++; f (x − 1))
else (λ y. assert (y = !r + x))
in
let g = f n in g n
We transform it to produce the program in SSA form with non-deterministic
method application at line 11, again unwinding with k = 2. Note that all assign-
ments have been replaced with let-bindings. This is because, in SSA form, we
think of references as SSA variables. In addition, we use keyword new to add
new for names to the repository.
1 let r1 = r0 in
2 letrec m1 =
3 λ x. if x then (r++; m1 (x−1))
4 else (λ y. assert(y = !r + x))
5 in
6 let ret3 =
7 if n then (let r2 = r1 + 1 in
8 if n−1 then (let r3 = r2 + 1 in nil)
9 else (new m3 = λ y. assert(y = !r+n−1) in m3))
10 else (new m2 = λ y. assert(y = !r + n) in m2)
11 in match ret3 with
12 | nil → nil
13 | m3 → assert(n = r3 + n−1)
14 | m2 → assert(n = r3 + n)
We can then build model φ for the example. For economy, we hide the nuances of
propagating nil and fail in predicate Fa,bP , which is short-hand for F reta retb P .
We also omit F wherever no fail or nil appears in the term, and directly return
constants instead of translating them. To construct the formula, we traverse the
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term in order, and add clauses in order of traversal. Note that the “else” branch
is always explored first in conditionals.
φ =F2,1(ret1 = ret2) ∧ (r1 = r0) (line 1)
∧ F9,2(ret2 = ret9) (line 6)
∧ F4,3(F5,3(ret = (n = 0)?ret4 : ret5)) (line 7)
∧ (ret4 = m2) (line 10)
∧ F6,5(ret5 = ret6) ∧ (r2 = r1 + 1) (line 7)
∧ F7,6(F8,6(ret6 = ((n− 1) = 0)?ret7 : ret8)) (line 8)
∧ (ret7 = m3) (line 9)
∧ F9,8(ret8 = ret9) ∧ (r3 = r2 + 1) (line 8)
∧ F (ret9 = nil) (line 8)
∧ ((ret = m3)⇒ (ret10 = ret11)) (line 13)
∧ ((ret11 = ((n = r3 + n− 1) = 0)?fail : ()) (line 13)
∧ ((ret = m2)⇒ (ret10 = ret13)) (line 14)
∧ (ret13 = ((n = r3 + n) = 0)?fail : ()) (line 14)
In this case, if we set r0 = 0, recalling k = 2, then φ∧(ret1 = nil) is satisfiable
with a minimum n = 2, since we need at least k = n+1 iterations to reach n = 0
(which is also the case for a negative n, as the program would diverge). With
r0 = 0, however, we cannot violate the assertion, i.e. φ ∧ (ret1 = fail) is not
satisfiable. Setting r0 = 1, on the other hand, causes φ ∧ (ret1 = fail) to be
satisfiable with n = 0 or n = 1.
Bounded Model Checking with the Translation The steps to do a k-bounded
model checking of some configuration (M,R, S, k) using the bounded translation
algorithm described previously are as follows:
1. Build the initial axioms/preconditions:
φ0 =
∧
r∈S(r = S(r)).
2. Build the initial SSA maps:
C0 = {r 7→ r0 | r ∈ dom(S)}.
3. Compute the translation:JM0, R, C0, C0, φ0, kK = (ret, φ,R′, C,D).
4. This is where the expressiveness of fail and nil becomes relevant. To check
for:
(a) sound errors:
φ′ = (ret = fail) ∧ φ
(b) reached bounds (for verification):
φ′ = (ret = nil) ∧ φ
(c) a specific return property p:
φ′ = ¬p ∧ φ, e.g. φ′ = ¬(ret > 5) ∧ φ
(d) a specific store property pr:
φ′ = ¬pr ∧ φ, e.g. φ′ = ¬(D(r) > 5) ∧ φ
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5. Transform φ′ to the relevant SMT solver format (e.g. SMT-Lib), and use the
SMT solver to get a satisfying assignment.
6. When checking for fail, if the formula is unsatisfiable, we can increase the
bound given checking for nil is satisfiable. If nil is not satisfiable either, then
the program has been verified.
Note that checks for store properties (d) can be combined with any of the prop-
erties mentioned in step (6), including other store properties. It is only possible
to check other properties (a,b, and c) independent of each other, however. This
is because the translation is deterministic and will always output a unique result.
For instance, the return value cannot be both fail and nil in the same satisfying
assignment, i.e. the formula φ∧(ret = nil)∧(ret = fail) is unsatisfiable. Moreover,
while the semantics requires closed terms, the translation is indifferent towards
free variables. As such, it will handle top-level input arguments and said free
variables by simply adding them into the formula, which will produce a unique
return for each valid assignment of the input arguments. This is, in fact, one of
the most useful applications of BMC, since it then generates counter-examples
from said input arguments. These free variables, however, must be of ground
type. The translation will not mind if a free variable is given a higher-order
type. But then the resulting formula becomes unsound, since we do not model
unknown program code. The simplest solution is to make the formula always
unsatisfiable to avoid spurious errors. Handling open terms with higher-order
free variables will be discussed in more detail as future work.
4 Soundness of the BMC translation
In this section we prove that our BMC algorithm is sound for input terms that
are closed or contain open variables of ground type.
We start off with some definitions. An assignment σ : Vars ⇀ CVals is
a finite map from variables to closed values. Given a term M , we write M{σ}
for the term obtained by applying σ to M . On the other hand, applying σ to
a method repository R, we obtain the repository R{σ} = {m 7→ R(m){σ} |
m ∈ dom(R)} – and similarly for stores S. Then, given a valid configuration
(M,R, S, k), we have (M,R, S, k){σ} = (M{σ}, R{σ}, S{σ}, k).
Given a formula ψ and an assignment σ, we say σ represents ψ, and write
σ ' ψ, if:
– σ satisfies ψ (written σ  ψ);
– ψ implies σ: ∀x ∈ dom(σ). ψ =⇒ x = σ(x).
Given assignment σ, we define a formula σ◦ representing it by: σ◦ =
∧
x∈dom(σ)(x =
σ(x)).
Given a valid configuration (M,R, S, k), let us set:
CS = {r 7→ r0 | r ∈ dom(S)} φS =
∧
r∈dom(S)(r0 = S(r))
and define: JM,R, S, kK = JM,R,CS , CS , φS , kK.
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Theorem 1 (Soundness). Given a valid configuration (M,R, S, k) whose open
variables are of ground type, suppose JM,R, S, kK = (ret, φ,R′′, C,D). Then, for
all assignments σ0 closing (M,R, S, k), the following are equivalent:
1. (M,R, S, k){σ0} ⇓ (χ′, R′, S′, k′)
2. ∃χ ∼dom(R) χ′. (φ ∧ σ◦0) =⇒ (ret = χ).
Proof. Take σS = {r0 7→ S(r){σ0} | r ∈ dom(S)} and σ′0 = σ0 ∪ σS . By
construction then, φS ∧ σ◦0 ∼= σ′0. Let us set φ′ = φ ∧ σ◦0 . From the assumption
and the fact that the translation propagates the formula σ◦0 from the initial
condition (Lemma 5), we have:
JM,R,CS , CS , φS ∧ σ◦0 , kK = (ret, φ′, R′′, C,D)
Moreover, (M,R,CS , k){σ′0} = (M,R, S, k){σ0} is valid and closed so, by Lemma 2,
we have that (M,R, S, k){σ0} ⇓ (χˆ, Rˆ, Sˆ, kˆ) and ∃σ1 ⊇ σ′0. (σ1 ' φ′) ∧ φ′ =⇒
(ret = χˆ).
Suppose now (1) holds. By Lemma 1, we have that χ′ ∼dom(R) χˆ, so taking
χ = χˆ we obtain (2).
On the other hand, if (2) holds then φ′ implies ret = χ and ret = χˆ. Since
φ′ ∼= σ1, we get χ = σ1(ret) = χˆ. Hence, χ′ ∼dom(R) χˆ and we conclude using
Lemma 1.
Theorem 1 uses the following main lemma, which is shown in the Appendix.
Below we assume that
σ, σ′ : (Vars ∪ SSAVars) ⇀ CVals ∪ {fail,nil}
are extended assignments. Accordingly, an extended term is a term that may
contain nil, nilM or failM as a subterm (extended terms are closed under ex-
tended assignments). Extended configurations are defined in a similar manner,
and we use the same operational semantics rule to evaluate them. In particu-
lar, extended configurations may contain extended terms with free variables, or
fail/nil, in evaluating position. We do not add special rules for those – they get
stuck.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Given M,R,C,D, k, φ, σ such that σ ' φ and
(M,R,D, k){σ} is terminating, if JM,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′) then:
– (M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, Sˆ, kˆ) and ∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ' φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ),
and
– if χ /∈ {fail,nil}, then Rˆ ⊆ R′{σ′} and Sˆ = D′{σ′}.
5 A Points-to Analysis for Names
The presence of non-deterministic method application in our BMC translation
is a primary source of combinatorial explosion of the algorithm. As such, a more
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precise filtering of R is necessary for scalability. In this section we describe an op-
timisation on non-deterministic method application inspired by points-to anal-
ysis. Points-to analysis provides an overapproximation of the points-to set of
each variable inside a program, that is, the set of locations that it may point
to. Here instead we devise an analysis that overapproximates the set of methods
that may be bound to each variable in the bounded unfolding of a program in
SSA form. This way, we can reduce the branching caused by non-deterministic
method application in the BMC translation.
Traditionally, the problem of which method to apply per method application
is one that CFA [11,14,9] answers. In our setting, however, methods are repre-
sented by names, which reduces the task of higher-order method application to
keeping track of names used in a first-order term (and, additionally, names can
be stored). This allows us to address the same problem as CFA with a simpler
points-to analysis for names. Note that this program analysis is not as expressive
as full points-to analysis, in the sense that we do not need to consider pointers
pointing at pointers.
Points-to analysis algorithms often belong to one of two families: Steengaard-
style [15] and Andersen-style [2], also known as unification-based and inclusion-
based flow-insensitive analyses respectively [7]. These are typically constrain-
based analyses whereby one goes through the code of a program and allocates
constraints to each reference/variable assignment, and subsequently solves them
in a global manner. In our case, the BMC translation already performs a recursive
analysis on terms, which we can use to make the points-to analysis more precise
and local, while remaining efficient.
The analysis looks at references and variables, and assigns to them a set of
method names that they may be referring/bound to. This is done via a finite
map
pt : (Refs ∪Vars) ⇀ Pts
where Pts contains all points-to sets and is given by:
Pts 3 A ::= X | 〈A,A〉 (where X ⊆fin Meths).
Thus, a points-to set is either a finite set of names or a pair of points-to sets.
In the BMC translation, points-to sets need to be created when a method name
is created. Moreover, they need to be assigned to references or variables in the
following cases:
r := M add in pt: r 7→ pt(M)
let x = M inM ′ add in pt: x 7→ pt(M)
xM add in pt: ret(M) 7→ pt(M)
where ret(M) is the variable assigned to the result of M . The letrec follows a
similar logic. The need to have sets of names, instead of single names, in the
range of pt is that the analysis, being symbolic, branches on conditionals and
applications, so the method pointed to by a reference cannot be decided during
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the analysis. Thus, when joining after branching, we merge the pt maps obtained
from all branches.
The points-to algorithm is presented next. Given a valid configuration (M,R, S, k),
the algorithm returns PT (M,R, S, k) = (ret, A,R, pt), where A is the points-to
set of ret, and pt is the overall points-to map computed. The union operator for
two points-to sets of matching form is:
A ∪B =
{
〈A1 ∪B1, A2 ∪B2〉 if A,B = 〈A1, A2〉, 〈B1, B2〉
A ∪B if A,B ⊆Meths
while the merge of points-to maps is given by:
merge(pt1, . . . , ptn) = {x 7→
⋃
i
pˆti | x ∈
⋃
i
dom(pti)}
where pˆti(x) = pti(x) if x ∈ dom(pti), and ∅ otherwise.
Base Cases:
– PT (M,R, pt, nil) = (ret,∅, R, pt)
– PT (fail, R, pt, k) = (ret,∅, R, pt)
– PT (v,R, pt, k) = (ret,∅, R, pt), where v = i, ()
– PT (m,R, pt, k) = (ret, {m}, R, pt)
– PT (x,R, pt, k) = (ret, pt(x), R, pt)
– PT (!r,R, pt, k) = (ret, pt(r), R, pt)
– PT (λx.M,R, pt, k) = (ret, {m}, R[m 7→ λ.M ], pt)
Inductive Cases:
– PT (piiM,R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M,R, pt, k) in
(ret, piiA1, R1, pt1)
– PT (r := M,R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M,R, pt, k) in
(ret,∅, R1, pt1[r 7→ A1])
– PT (M1 ⊕M2, R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M1, R, pt, k) in
let (ret2, A2, R2, pt2) = PT (M2, R1, pt1, k) in
(ret,∅, R2, pt2)
– PT (〈M1,M2〉, R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M1, R, pt, k) in
let (ret2, A2, R2, pt2) = PT (M2, R1, pt1, k) in
(ret, 〈A1, A2〉, R2, pt2)
– PT (let x = M in M ′, R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M,R, pt, k) in
PT (M ′{ret1/x}, R1, pt1[ret1 7→ A1], k)
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– PT (letrec f = λx.M in M ′, R, pt, k) =
let m, f ′ be fresh in
PT (M ′{f ′/f}, R[m 7→ λx.M{f ′/f}], pt[f ′ 7→ {m}], k)
– PT (mM,R, pt, k) =
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M,R, pt, k) in
let R(m) be λx.N in
PT (N{ret1/x}, R1, pt1[ret1 7→ A1], k)
– PT (if Mb then M1 else M0, R, pt, k) =
let (retb, Ab, Rb, ptb) = PT (Mb, R, pt, k) in
let (ret0, A0, R0, pt0) = PT (M0, Rb, ptb, k) in
let (ret1, A1, R1, pt1) = PT (M1, R0, ptb, k) in
(ret, A0 ∪A1, R1,merge(pt0, pt1))
– PT (xθM,R, pt, k) =
let (ret0, A0, R0, pt0) = PT (M,R, pt, k) in
let pt(x) be {m1, ...,mn} in
if n = 0 then (ret, ∅, R0, pt0) else:
let pt′0 = pt0[ret0 7→ A0] in for each i ∈ {1, ..., n} :
let R(mi) be λyi.N in
let (reti, Ai, Ri, pti) = PT (Ni{ret0/yi}, Ri−1, pt′0, k) in
(ret, A1 ∪ ... ∪An, Rn,merge(pt1, . . . , ptn))
The optimised BMC translation We can now incorporate the points-to analysis in
the BMC translation to get an optimised translation which operates on symbolic
configurations augmented with a points-to map, and returns:
JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kKPT = (ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′, A, pt′)
The optimised BMC translation is defined by lock-stepping the two algorithms
presented above (i.e. J K and PT ( )) and let J K be informed from PT ( ) in the
xM case, which now restricts the choices of names for x to the set pt(x). We
give the full algorithm in Appendix B. Its soundness is proven along the same
lines as the basic algorithm.
To illustrate the significance of reducing the set of names, we provide a simple
example.
Example 3. Consider the following program which recursively generates names
to compute triangular numbers.
letrec f = λ x.
if x ≤ 0 then 0
else let g = (λ y.x + y) in g (f (x−1))
in
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letrec f ’ = λ x.if x ≤ 0 then 0 else x + (f’ (x−1))
in assert(f n = f’ n)
Without points-to analysis, since f creates a new method, and the translation
considers all methods of matching type per recursive call, the number of names
to apply at depth m ≤ n when translating f(n) is approximately m!. This means
that the number of paths explored grows by the factorial of n, with the total
number of methods created being the left factorial sum !n, and total number of
names considered being the derangement of n. In contrast, f ′(n) only considers
n names with a linear growth in number of paths. With points-to analysis, the
number of names considered and created in f is reduced to that of f ′.
Other optimisations There are other notable deficiencies in our translation. The
first one involves our SSA transformation when branching. Particularly, this fo-
cuses on the join operations performed, since these add several clauses analogous
to φ functions in conventional SSA. In our approach, the store is updated after
branching, which serves as the join. This joining step is not very efficient as it
adds a guarded clause per reference per branch. For this, including insights from
standard SSA transformations may improve our translation. For example, one
naive way to improve performance (and decrease the size of the model) may be
to accumulate all changes, so we know exactly which references to update. A
more precise way would be to use dominators: an efficient dominance algorithm
would tell us which references may have been updated in order to reach some
point in a program. Finally, we can make use of Data-Flow Analysis–in particu-
lar, Liveness Analysis–to compute whether references are live or not. This could
reduce the number of join operations since we do not need to add clauses for
dead references. This can even be further expanded into dead code or dead store
elimination, which are useful standard optimisations in general.
The second deficiency is repository redundancy, which occurs when adding
new names into the method repository. One can imagine a program that creates
multiple copies of the same method, adding a new name to the repository each
time. Ideally, if a method is already present in the repository, we should not create
a new name. To address this, we can search the repository for a structurally
equivalent method when attempting to add a new name to it. This looks for the
existence of a name with an α-equivalent method body which we can use instead
of creating a new unnecessary name. One can even augment this solution by
using extensionality instead of structural equality.
Finally, there is the minor problem of unnecessary propagation clauses in
F . For instance, the translation guards every ret with a predicate F , creating
many unnecessary clauses. Given we must traverse the term, we should know
whether fail or nil are reachable in a term, which allows us to prune many of the
propagating clauses in F . To do this, we can return a variable q in a four-valued
logic for set Q = {0, Nil, Fail, Both}, where q ∈ Q is an overapproximation
for the reachability of fail and nil in a given term. In branching, two variables
q0, q1 ∈ Q can be combined by the commutative operation q0 + q1, which follows
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the equalities: q+ 0 = q, q+ q = q, and Nil+Fail = Both, for any q ∈ Q. With
this, we add in F the guards corresponding to the q returned. Specifically, if
q = Fail, we only add the clauses that propagate fail, and similarly for q = Nil.
For q = Both, we add clauses for both nil and fail, while adding no propagating
clauses when q = 0.
6 Implementation and Experiments
We implemented the translation algorithm in a prototype tool to model check
higher-order programs called BMC-2[8]. The tool takes program source code
written in an ML-like language based on OCaml, and produces a propositional
formula in SMT-LIB 2 format. This can then be fed to an SMT solver such as
Z3. Syntax of the input language is based on the subset of OCaml that cor-
responds to HORef. Differences between OCaml and our concrete syntax are
for ease of parsing and lack of type checking. For instance, all input programs
must be either written in “Barendregt Convention”, meaning all bound variables
must be fresh, or such that variables have the same type globally. Additionally,
all bound variables are annotated with types, as is left and right projection.
Internally, BMC-2 implements an abstract syntax that extends HORef with
vector arguments. This means that functions can take multiple arguments at
once. Intuitively, this is equivalent to adding let-bindings that apply each argu-
ment individually. We also implemented the optimisation to avoid unnecessary
propagation clauses, as previously described. The tool itself is written in OCaml.
To illustrate our input language, following is a sample program mc91-e from
the MoCHi benchmark in OCaml. The keyword Methods is used to define all
methods in the repository. The keyword Main is used to define the main method.
Methods :
mc91 ( x : Int ) : ( Int ) =
i f x >= 101 then
x + −10
else
mc91 (mc91 ( x + 1 1 ) ) ;
Main (n : Int ) : ( Unit ) :
i f n <= 102
then a s s e r t ( ( mc91 n) == 91)
else sk ip
For this sample program, our tool builds a translation with k = 1 for which
Z3 correctly reports that fail is reachable if n = 102. Details about experiments
will be provided later.
We tested our algorithm on 20 sample programs selected from the MoCHi
benchmark[13]. The programs were translated to our input language and checked
using our tool and Z3. Care was taken to keep all sample programs as close
to the original source code as our concrete syntax allows. All experiments ran
on a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU clocked at 3.40GHz
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and 16GB RAM. All tests were set to time-out at 10 seconds, and up to a
maximum bound k = 10. These limits were chosen due to the combinatorial
nature of model checking and the sample programs used. Since an increase in
the bound increases the state space exponentially, results beyond 10 seconds
did not seem as interesting. BMC-2 ran three times per program per bound.
Firstly, we measure performance of the base algorithm in terms of total time
spent checking each sample program. Secondly, we measure performance of the
translation with added points-to analysis for names and the difference it makes.
Finally, in addition to run time, if an error exists in a sample program, the lowest
bound needed to find a counterexample is recorded.
Results and Observations Figure 3 plots the average time taken for BMC-2 to
check the MoCHi benchmark programs. Table 1 records the percentage differ-
ence in average time taken per bound between BMC-2 without points-to analysis
and BMC-2 with points-to analysis. From these, one can see a dramatic improve-
ment in scalability of programs with non-deterministic method application. For
example, two previously infeasible programs hrec and hors timed out at k = 3
and k = 4 respectively. With points-to analysis, hrec times out at k = 9, while
hors does not time out. In fact, hors can be checked within the allocated time
for bounds upwards of k = 200.
While extending BMC-2 with points-to analysis has some overhead, the over-
head appears to be minimal or even negligible for this benchmark. The addition
of points-to analysis only negatively affected programs with non-deterministic
method application at lower bounds, while leaving programs without said method
application unaffected. This effect can be seen on Table 1, which shows a maxi-
mum increase in average execution time of 2.4% for k = 1. On average, however,
execution time decreased by 55.8%, with a maximum decrease of 96.8% for k = 3.
Only k = 1 was negatively affected.
We can also observe that performance of the BMC-2 heavily depends on
the program it is checking. This makes the possibility of full verification en-
tirely dependent on the nature of the program. For example, ack, which is an
implementation of the Ackermann function, is a deeply recursive program, and
thus cannot be translated by our algorithm any better than its normal growth.
This agrees with the intuition that BMC is not appropriate to find bugs in deep
recursion. As mentioned before, however, BMC has been shown empirically ef-
fective on shallow bugs in industry. To show this, Table 1 records the minimum
bound required for BMC-2 to find a counterexample. We can observe that all
bugs were shallow; occurring within k = 2. We can thus say that BMC is a very
inexpensive technique to find bugs in this benchmark.
Comparison with MoCHi We were unable to compile MoCHi on our machines.
Instead, we attempted to use the web interface and the Dockerfile image. Com-
parisons were unreliable, however, due to unexpected errors, which could have
been due to parsing, timeouts, or bad installation. What we noticed in some ex-
amples was that MoCHi took significantly longer to find bugs when we modified
its assertions. For instance, checking mult-e with assert(mult m m <= mult n n)
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Fig. 3. Average total execution times (s) with (bottom) and without (top) points-to
analysis on bounds k = 0 . . . 10
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Table 1. Smallest bound needed for BMC-2 with points-to analysis to find a coun-
terexample (left). Percentage change in average time taken per bound after adding
points-to analysis (right).
Program k time
mc91-e 1 0.011
mult-e 1 0.010
repeat-e 1 0.010
r-lock-e 2 0.012
sum-e 1 0.010
k %∆ k %∆
0 -10.928 6 -83.172
1 2.412 7 -73.968
2 -1.442 8 -62.803
3 -96.846 9 -49.481
4 -95.399 10 -47.611
5 -95.065
took 3.667 seconds on average, which is an increase from 0.087 seconds for the
original program (asserting n+1 <= mult n n). In contrast, at k = 1, BMC-2
takes 0.012 seconds, compared to the original 0.010 seconds.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 Given the following:
– an extended configuration (M,R,D, k){σ} which is terminating;
– a translation JM,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′);
– the extended assignment σ ∼= φ;
then:
– (M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, Sˆ) and ∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ),
and
– if χ /∈ {fail,nil}, then Rˆ ⊆ R′{σ′} and Sˆ = D′{σ′}.
Proof. By structural induction on M and by induction on the size of the deriva-
tion of the semantics of (M,R,D, k){σ}, we have the following base cases:
1. k = nil:
We want to show:
(M,R,D,nil){σ} ⇓ (nil, R{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = nil)
We choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ nil]. Since φ ∼= σ and ret is fresh, we have φ′ ∼= σ′.
Because φ′ = (ret = nil) ∧ φ, we know φ′ =⇒ (ret = nil).
2. M = fail and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
(fail, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (fail, R{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = fail)
Similarly to the nil case, we choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ fail].
3. M = v = i, (),m and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
(v,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v,R{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = v)
and R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and D{σ} = D{σ′}
We choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ v]. As before, φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = v).
Additionally, since ret is fresh, it is not in R or D. So R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and
D{σ} = D{σ′}.
4. M = x and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
(x,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and D{σ} = D{σ′}
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We know x 6= nil by termination of the configuration. As such, setting χ =
σ(x), χ cannot be nil. We thus choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ χ], which holds as
previous cases. Additionally, as with case v, R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and D{σ} =
D{σ′}.
5. M = !r and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
(!r,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v,R{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = v)
and R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and D{σ} = D{σ′}
Let us set v = σ(D(r)). We thus choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ v], which holds as
with previous cases. Again, R{σ} ⊆ R{σ′} and D{σ} = D{σ′}.
6. M = λx.M and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
(λx.M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (mˆ,R[mˆ 7→ λx.M ]{σ}, D{σ}) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = mˆ)
and R[mˆ 7→ λx.M ]{σ} ⊆ R[m 7→ λx.M ]{σ′} and D{σ} = D{σ′}
By nominal determinacy of the operational semantics, because m is fresh,
we can choose mˆ such that mˆ = m. With this, we choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ mˆ].
Therefore, as before, φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = mˆ). Additionally, since
m and mˆ are fresh, and we chose mˆ = m, we know that R[mˆ 7→ λx.M ] =
R[m 7→ λx.M ], so, as previously, R[mˆ 7→ λx.M ]{σ} ⊆ R[m 7→ λx.M ]{σ′}
and D{σ} = D{σ′}.
We proceed with the inductive cases, where k 6= nil:
1. M = piiM :
We want to show:
(piiM,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ R1{σ′} and S = D1{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
By cases on the operational semantics:
(a) if M{σ} does not abort, by rule (⇓pii), we know that:
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (〈v1, v2〉, Rˆ, S)
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis, we know that:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = 〈v1, v2〉)
and Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S = D1{σ1}
We choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ vi]. Since M does not abort and pii〈v1, v2〉 = vi,
we know χ = vi. Therefore, σ
′ ∼= φ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). Additionally,
since σ′ ⊇ σ1 and ret is fresh, and because Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S =
D1{σ1}, we know that Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ′} and S = D1{σ′}.
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(b) if M{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓pii), we have:
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ})
Since σ ∼= φ, we proceed by the Inductive Hypothesis as previously:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret = χ)
Let us now set χ = σ(ret1), where χ must be fail or nil. We then choose
σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ σ(ret1)], so σ′ ∼= φ′ as with the previous case.
Case r := M is proven similarly, where M evaluates to some values v instead
of a pair, and the whole term evaluates to () instead of vi.
2. M = M1 ⊕M2:
We want to show:
(M1 ⊕M2, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ R2{σ′} and S = D2{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
By cases on the operational semantics:
(a) if neither M1{σ} or M2{σ} abort, then by rule (⇓⊕), we have:
(M1, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (i1, Rˆ1, S1)
(M2{σ}, Rˆ1, S1, k) ⇓ (i2, Rˆ2, S2)
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis, we know that:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = i1)
and Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S1 = D1{σ1}
And, because Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S1 = D1{σ1}, by weakening the config-
uration, we have:
(M2{σ}, R1{σ1}, S1, k) ⇓ (i2, Rˆ′2, S2)
such that Rˆ′2 ⊇ Rˆ2. Now, since σ1 ∼= φ1, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ2 ⊇ σ1.σ2 ∼= φ2 and φ2 =⇒ (ret2 = i2)
and Rˆ′2 ⊆ R2{σ2} and S2 = D2{σ2}
We choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ i] where i = i1 ⊕ i2. Let us set χ = i. As with
earlier cases, we know φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). Additionally, we
have Rˆ2 ⊆ Rˆ′2 ⊆ R2{σ2} and S2 = D2{σ2}.
(b) if M1{σ} aborts, by rule (6⇓⊕1), we have:
(M1, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ})
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Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis we know:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = χ)
And since φ1 ∼= σ1, by Lemma 3, we know:
∃σ2 ⊇ σ1.σ2 ∼= φ2
Let us set χ = σ2(ret1) where χ ∈ {fail,nil}. We now choose σ′ =
σ2[ret 7→ σ2(ret1)], so φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ).
(c) if M1{σ} does not abort, but M2{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓⊕2):
(M1, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (i1, Rˆ1, S1)
(M2{σ}, Rˆ1, S1, k) ⇓ (χ, Rˆ1, S1)
This case is proven like case (a), where we choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ σ2(ret2)]
instead, and χ = σ2(ret2) must be either fail or nil. We do not need to
show Rˆ2 ⊆ R2{σ2} and S2 = D2{σ2} here.
Case 〈M1,M2〉 is proven in the same way, except we evaluate to values v1
and v2 instead of i1 and i2, and instead of i = i1 ⊕ i2, we have 〈v1, v2〉.
3. M = let x = M in M ′:
We want to show:
(let x = M in M ′, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ R2{σ′} and S = D2{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
By cases on the operational semantics:
(a) if neither M{σ} or M ′{v1/x}{σ} abort, then by rule (⇓let):
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v1, Rˆ1, S1)
(M ′{v1/x}{σ}, Rˆ1, S1, k) ⇓ (v2, Rˆ2, S2)
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis, we know that:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = v1)
and Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S1 = D1{σ1}
And, because Rˆ1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S1 = D1{σ1}, then, again, by weakening
and because σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = v1), we have:
(M ′{ret1/x}, R1, S1, k){σ1} ⇓ (v2, Rˆ′2, S2)
such that Rˆ′2 ⊇ Rˆ2. Now, since σ1 ∼= φ1, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ2 ⊇ σ1.σ2 ∼= φ2 and φ2 =⇒ (ret2 = v2)
and Rˆ′2 ⊆ R2{σ2} and S2 = D2{σ2}
We choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ v2]. Let us set χ = v2. As earlier, we know
φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). We also have Rˆ2 ⊆ Rˆ′2 ⊆ R2{σ2} and
S2 = D2{σ2}.
Higher-Order Bounded Model Checking 29
(b) if M{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓let1):
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ})
This case is identical to 2.(b).
(c) if M{σ} does not abort, but M ′{v1/x}{σ} does, then by rule ( 6⇓let2):
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v1, Rˆ1, S1)
(M ′{v1/x}{σ}, Rˆ1, S1, k) ⇓ (χ, Rˆ1, S1)
This case is identical to 2.(c).
Case mM is proven similarly, where we choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ v2] instead,
and decrement k upon substitution, which gives us the evaluation rule:
(N{v1/x}{σ}1, Rˆ1, S1, k − 1) ⇓ (v2, Rˆ2, S2)
4. M = letrec f = λx.M in M ′:
We want to show:
(letrec f = λx.M in M ′, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ R′{σ′} and S = D′{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
We choose σ1 = σ[f
′ 7→ m]. Since σ1 ∼= (f ′ = m) ∧ φ, this case is directly
proven by the inductive hypothesis.
5. M = if Mb then M1 else M0:
We want to show:
(if Mb then M1 else M0, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ R1{σ′} and S = C ′{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
By cases on the operational semantics:
(a) if Mb{σ} evaluates to i, and Mj{σ} does not abort–where j = 0 if i = 0,
and j = 1 otherwise–then by rule (⇓if):
(Mb, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (i, Rˆb, Sb)
(Mj{σ}, Rˆb, Sb, k) ⇓ (v, Rˆj , Sj)
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis, we know that:
∃σb ⊇ σ.σb ∼= φb and φb =⇒ (retb = j)
and Rˆb ⊆ Rb{σb} and Sb = Db{σb}
Now, by cases on j:
30 Yu-Yang Lin and Nikos Tzevelekos
i. if j = 0 then, since Rˆb ⊆ Rb{σb} and Sb = Db{σb}, by weakening
and because σb ∼= φb, we have:
(M0, Rb, Sb, k){σb} ⇓ (v, Rˆ′0, S0)
such that Rˆ′0 ⊇ Rˆ0. Since σ0 ∼= φ0, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ0 ⊇ σb.σ0 ∼= φ0 and φ0 =⇒ (ret0 = v)
and Rˆ′0 ⊆ R0{σ0} and S0 = D0{σ0}
Now, because φ0 ∼= σ0, by Lemma 3 we have:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ0.σ1 ∼= φ1
We can then choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ v]. Let us set χ = v. As earlier,
we know φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). We also know by Lemma 4
that R0 must be preserved in R1, which means Rˆ0 ⊆ Rˆ′0 ⊆ R0{σ0} ⊆
R1{σ1}. Additionally, because i = 0, we know S0 = D0{σ0}.
ii. if j = 1 then, since φb ∼= σb, we have by Lemma 3:
∃σ0 ⊇ σb.σ0 ∼= φ0
Now, by Lemma 4, we know Rb must be preserved in R0, so we have
Rˆb ⊆ Rb ⊆ R0. This gives us:
(M1, R0, Sb, k){σ0} ⇓ (v, Rˆ′1, S1)
such that Rˆ′1 ⊇ R1. Thus, because σ0 ∼= φ0, we know by the Inductive
Hypothesis that:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ0.σ1 ∼= φ1 and φ1 =⇒ (ret1 = v)
and Rˆ′1 ⊆ R1{σ1} and S1 = D1{σ1}
We now choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ v]. Let us set χ = v. As earlier, we
know φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). We also know Rˆ′1 ⊆ R1{σ1}
and because i 6= 0, we know S1 = D1{σ1}.
(b) if M{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓if1):
(Mb, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ})
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis we know:
∃σb ⊇ σ.σb ∼= φb and φb =⇒ (retb = χ)
Then since φb ∼= σb, by Lemma 3, we know:
∃σ0 ⊇ σb.σ0 ∼= φ0
And because φ0 ∼= σ0, by Lemma 3 again, we know:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ0.σ1 ∼= φ1
Let us then set χ = σ1(retb) where χ ∈ {fail,nil}. We choose σ′ =
σ1[ret 7→ σ1(retb)], so φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ).
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(c) if Mb{σ} evaluates to i, but Mj{σ} aborts–where j = 0 if i = 0, and
j = 1 otherwise–then by rule (6⇓if2):
(Mb, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (i, Rˆb, Sb)
(Mj{σ}, Rˆb, Sb, k) ⇓ (χ, Rˆb, Sb)
This case is proven like case (a), where we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ σ1(retj)]
instead, and χ = σ1(retj) must be either fail or nil. Additionally, because
the configuration aborts, we are not required to show conditions involving
the repository and store.
6. M = xM :
We want to show:
(xM,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ, Rˆ, S) and
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.(σ′ ∼= φ′) and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ)
and Rˆ ⊆ Rn{σ′} and S = C ′n{σ′}, if χ 6∈ {fail,nil}
Let us set σ(x) = mj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By cases on the operational
semantics:
(a) if neither M{σ} or Nj{v/yj}{σ} abort, then by rule (⇓@):
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v0, Rˆ0, S0)
(Nj{v/yj}{σ}, Rˆ0, S0, k − 1) ⇓ (vj , Rˆj , Sj)
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis, we know that:
∃σ0 ⊇ σ.σ0 ∼= φ0 and φ0 =⇒ (ret0 = v0)
and Rˆ0 ⊆ R0{σ0} and S0 = D0{σ0}
Now, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, we can consecutively apply Lemma 3,
starting from σ0 ∼= φ0, to obtain:
∃σj−1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ σ0.σj−1 ∼= φj−1
Then, because Rˆ0 ⊆ R0{σ0} ⊆ · · · ⊆ Rj−1{σj−1} and S0 = D0{σ0} =
D0{σj−1}, by weakening and because σj−1 ∼= φj−1, we have:
(Nj{v/yj}{σj−1}, Rj−1{σj−1}, S0, k) ⇓ (vj , Rˆ′j , Sj)
such that Rˆ′j ⊇ Rˆj . So, because σj−1 ∼= φj−1, by the Inductive Hypoth-
esis:
∃σj ⊇ σj−1.σj ∼= φj and φj =⇒ (retj = vj)
and Rˆ′j ⊆ Rj{σ0} and Sj = Dj{σj}
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Now, because φj ∼= σj , again by consecutively applying Lemma 3, we
have:
∃σn ⊇ ...σj .σn ∼= φn
We can then choose σ′ = σn[ret 7→ vj ]. Let us set χ = vj . Again, we
know φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ). We also know by Lemma 4 that Rj
must be preserved in Rn, which means Rˆj ⊆ Rˆ′j ⊆ Rj{σj} ⊆ Rn{σn}.
Additionally, we know Sj = Dj{σn}.
(b) if M{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓@1):
(Mb, R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (χ,R{σ}, D{σ})
Since σ ∼= φ, by the Inductive Hypothesis we know:
∃σ0 ⊇ σ.σ0 ∼= φ0 and φ0 =⇒ (ret0 = χ)
Then since φ0 ∼= σ0, as before, by applying Lemma 3 consecutively, we
know:
∃σn ⊇ ... ⊇ σ0.σn ∼= φn
Let us then set χ = σn(ret0) where χ ∈ {fail,nil}. We choose σ′ =
σn[ret 7→ σn(ret0)], so φ′ ∼= σ′ and φ′ =⇒ (ret = χ).
(c) if M{σ} does not abort, but Nj{v/yj}{σ} aborts, then by rule ( 6⇓@2) we
have:
(M,R,D, k){σ} ⇓ (v, Rˆ0, S0)
(Nj{v/yj}{σ}, Rˆ0, S0, k − 1) ⇓ (χ, Rˆ0, S0)
This case is proven like case (a), where we choose σ′ = σn[ret 7→
σn(retj)], and χ = σn(retj) must be either fail or nil. Additionally,
because the configuration aborts, we do not need to prove conditions for
the repository and store.
Lemma 3 (Uniqueness of the translation). Given an assignment σ and φ
where σ ∼= φ, and a translation JM,R,C,D, φ, kK = (ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′), we know
there exists some σ′ ⊇ σ such that σ′ ∼= φ′.
Proof. Assuming σ ∼= φ, by induction on k and then by structural induction on
M , we have the base cases:
1. k = nil:
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((ret = nil) ∧ φ)
We choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ nil]. Since σ ∼= φ, and the only fresh name ret maps
to nil in σ′, we know σ′ ∼= ((ret = nil) ∧ φ).
2. M = fail and k 6= nil:
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((ret = fail) ∧ φ)
We choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ fail], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = fail) ∧ φ). Similarly for the
remaining base cases:
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(a) for M = v = i, (), choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ v], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = v) ∧ φ).
(b) for M = m, choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ m], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = m) ∧ φ).
(c) for M = x, choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ x], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = x) ∧ φ).
(d) for M = !r, choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ σ(D(r))], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = D(r)) ∧ φ).
(e) for M = λx.M , choose σ′ = σ[ret 7→ m], so σ′ ∼= ((ret = m) ∧ φ).
With base cases done, we recall predicate formula F :
F a b P =((a = fail) =⇒ (b = fail)) ∧
((a = nil) =⇒ (b = nil)) ∧
((a = fail) ∨ (a = nil) ∨ P )
We then have the following inductive cases:
1. M = piiM :
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((F ret1 ret(ret = piiret1)) ∧ φ1)
We have σ ∼= φ, so by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1
Let us set χ = σ1(ret1). By cases on χ:
(a) if χ = 〈v1, v2〉, we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ vi].
(b) if χ ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ χ].
2. M = r := M :
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((F ret1 ret(ret = piiret1)) ∧ φ1)
We have σ ∼= φ, so by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1
Let us set χ = σ1(ret1). By cases on χ:
(a) if χ = v, we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ (), D(r) 7→ v].
(b) if χ ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ χ]. We then know σ′ uniquely
satisfies φ′ up to the disjoint succeeding clause of F , which contains D(r).
Since the disjunction is trivially true, we are allowed to extend σ′ to map
D(r) to an arbitrary value, e.g. σ′′ = σ′[D(r) 7→ χ]. Because there exists
a σ′′ ⊇ σ′ that satisfies φ′, and φ′ implies σ′, we have σ′ ∼= φ′.
3. M = M1 ⊕M2:
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((F ret1 ret(F ret2 ret(ret = ret1 ⊕ ret2))) ∧ φ2)
We have σ ∼= φ, so by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ.σ1 ∼= φ1
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Since σ1 ∼= φ1, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ2 ⊇ σ1.σ2 ∼= φ2
Let us set χ1 = σ2(ret1) and χ2 = σ2(ret2). By cases on χ1, χ2:
(a) if χ1 = v1 and χ2 = v2, we choose σ
′ = σ2[ret 7→ v], where v = v1 ⊕ v2.
(b) if χ1 ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ χ1].
(c) if χ1 = v1 and χ2 ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ χ2].
A similar proof applies to cases:
(a) 〈M1,M2〉, where σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ 〈v1, v2〉] is chosen instead of v in (a).
(b) ‘let x = M in M ′’ and ‘mM ’, where σ′ = σ2[ret 7→ v2] is chosen instead
of v in (a).
4. M = letrec f = λx.M in M ′:
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= (φ′)
where φ′ is the result of translating M ′{f ′/f}.
Choose σ1 = σ[f 7→ m] such that σ1 ∼= (φ ∧ (f ′ = m)). This case is then
directly proven by the inductive hypothesis.
5. M = if Mb then M1 else M0:
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((F retb ret(ψ0 ∧ ψ1)) ∧ φ1)
We have σ ∼= φ, so by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σb ⊇ σ.σb ∼= φb
Since σb ∼= φb, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ0 ⊇ σb.σ0 ∼= φ0
Since σ0 ∼= φ0, by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ1 ⊇ σ0.σ1 ∼= φ1
Let us set χb = σ1(retb), χ0 = σ1(ret0) and χ1 = σ1(ret1). By cases on χb:
(a) if χb = i, we choose σ
′ = σ1[ret 7→ χj , C ′(r) 7→ Dj(r)] for every r ∈ Π,
where j = 0 if i = 0, else j = 1.
(b) if χb ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σ1[ret 7→ χb]. We know σ′ uniquely
satisfies φ′ up to the disjoint succeeding clauses of F involving ψ0 and
ψ1, which contain C
′(r) for all r ∈ Π. Since the disjunction is trivially
true, we are allowed to extend σ′ to map C ′(r) to an arbitrary value, e.g.
σ′′ = σ′[C(r) 7→ χb] for each r ∈ Π. Because there exists a σ′′ ⊇ σ′ that
satisfies φ′, and φ′ implies σ′, we have σ′ ∼= φ′.
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6. M = xM :
We want to show:
∃σ′ ⊇ σ.σ′ ∼= ((F ret0 retψ) ∧ φn)
We have σ ∼= φ, so by the Inductive Hypothesis:
∃σ0 ⊇ σ.σ0 ∼= φ0
Since σ0 ∼= φ0, by the Inductive Hypothesis applied consecutively:
∃σn ⊇ · · · ⊇ σ0.(σn ∼= φn) ∧ ... ∧ (σ0 ∼= φ0)
Let us set χ0, . . . , χn = σn(ret0), . . . , σn(retn). Let us also set σ(x) = mj
where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By cases on χ0:
(a) if χ0 = v, we choose σ
′ = σn[ret 7→ χj , C ′(r) 7→ Dj(r)] for each r ∈ Π.
(b) if χ0 ∈ {fail,nil}, we choose σ′ = σn[ret 7→ χ0]. We know σ′ uniquely
satisfies φ′ up to the disjoint succeeding clauses of F involving ψ, which
contains C ′(r) for all r ∈ Π. Since the disjunction is trivially true, we
are allowed to extend σ′ to map C ′(r) to an arbitrary value, e.g. σ′′ =
σ′[C(r) 7→ χ0] for each r ∈ Π. Because there exists a σ′′ ⊇ σ′ that
satisfies φ′, and φ′ implies σ′, we have σ′ ∼= φ′.
Lemma 4 (Preservation of the repository). Given a translation JM,R,C,D, φ, kK =
(ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′), we know the input repository must be preserved; i.e. R′ ⊇ R.
Proof. By inspection of the translation rules.
Lemma 5 (Propagation of preconditions). Given a translation JM,R,C,D, φ, kK =
(ret, φ′, R′, C ′, D′), we know that preconditions φ must be propagated and in-
cluded in φ′; i.e. φ′ = ψ ∧ φ where JM,R,C,D,>, kK = (ret, ψ,R′, C ′, D′)
Proof. By inspection of the translation rules.
Appendix B Optimised BMC translation
Base Cases:
– JM,R,C,D, pt, φ,nilK = (ret, (ret = nil) ∧ φ,R,C,D,∅, pt)
– Jfail, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = fail) ∧ φ,R,C,D,∅, pt)
– Jv,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = v) ∧ φ,R,C,D,∅, pt) where v = i, ()
– Jm,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = m) ∧ φ,R,C,D, {m}, pt)
– Jx,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = x) ∧ φ,R,C,D, pt(x), pt)
– J!r,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = D(r)) ∧ φ,R,C,D, pt(r), pt)
– Jλx.M,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK = (ret, (ret = m) ∧ φ,R′, C,D, {m}, pt)
where R′ = R[m 7→ λx.M ] and m fresh
Inductive Cases:
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– JpiiM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (ret = pii ret1)) ∧ φ1, R1, C1, D1, piiA1, pt1)
– Jr := M,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let C ′1 = C1[r] in let D
′
1 = D1[r 7→ C ′1(r)] in
(ret, (F ret1 ret ((ret = ()) ∧ (D′1(r) = ret1))) ∧ φ1, R1, C ′1, D′1,∅, pt1[r 7→ A1])
– JM1 ⊕M2, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2, A2, pt2) = JM2, R1, C1, D1, pt1, φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret1 ⊕ ret2))) ∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2,∅, pt2)
– J〈M1,M2〉, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2, A2, pt2) = JM2, R1, C1, D1, pt1, φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = 〈ret1, ret2〉))) ∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2, 〈A1, A2〉, pt2)
– Jlet x = M in M ′, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2, A2, pt2) = JM ′{ret1/x}, R1, C1, D1, pt1[ret1 7→ A1], φ1, kK in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret2))) ∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2, A2, pt2)
– Jletrec f = λx.M in M ′, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let m, f ′ be fresh in
let R′ = R[m 7→ λx.M{f ′/f}] inJM ′{f ′/f}, R′, C,D, pt[f ′ 7→ {m}], φ ∧ (f ′ = m), kK
– JmM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let R(m) be λx.N in
let (ret2, φ2, R2, C2, D2) = JN{ret1/x}, R1, C1, D1, pt1[ret1 7→ A1], φ1, k − 1K in
(ret, (F ret1 ret (F ret2 ret (ret = ret2))) ∧ φ2, R2, C2, D2, A2, pt2)
– Jif Mb then M1 else M0, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (retb, φb, Rb, Cb, Db, Ab, ptb) = JMb, R, C,D, pt, φ, kK in
let (ret0, φ0, R0, C0, D0, A0, pt0) = JM0, Rb, Cb, Db, ptb, φb, kK in
let (ret1, φ1, R1, C1, D1, A1, pt1) = JM1, R0, C0, Db, ptb, φ0, kK in
let C ′ = C1[r1] · · · [rn] (Π = {r1, . . . , rn}) in
let ψ0 = (retb = 0) =⇒ (F ret0 ret ((ret = ret0) ∧
∧
r∈Π
(C ′(r) = D1(r)))) in
let ψ1 = (retb 6= 0) =⇒ (F ret1 ret ((ret = ret1) ∧
∧
r∈Π
(C ′(r) = D1(r)))) in
(ret, (F retb ret (ψ0 ∧ ψ1)) ∧ φ1, R1, C ′, C ′, A0 ∪A1,merge(pt0, pt1))
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– JxθM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK =
let (ret0, φ0, R0, C0, D0, A0, pt0) = JM,R,C,D, pt, φ, kK in
if pt(x) = ∅ then (ret, (ret = nil) ∧ φ0, R0, C0, D0,∅, pt0)
else let pt(x) be {m1, ...,mn} in
for each i ∈ {1, ..., n} :
let R(mi) be λyi.N in
let (reti, φi, Ri, Ci, Di, Ai, pti) = JNi{ret0/yi}, Ri−1, Ci−1, D0, pt0, φi−1, k − 1K in
let C ′n = Cn[r1] · · · [rj ] (Π = {r1, . . . , rj}) in
let ψ =
n∧
i=1
(
(x = mi) =⇒ ((F reti ret (ret = reti)) ∧
∧
r∈Π
(C ′n(r) = Di(r)))
)
in
(ret, (F ret0 ret ψ) ∧ φn, Rn, C ′n, C ′n, A1 ∪ · · · ∪An,merge(pt1, . . . , ptn))
